

## HISTORICAL FIGURES OF THE GREET STEPPE: ABULKHAIR KNAN AND SULTAN ABYLAI

LYUBINCHANKOVSKIY S.V.<sup>1</sup> 

**Lyubinchankovskiy Sergey Valentinovich<sup>1</sup>** – doctor of historical sciences, professor, leading researcher, Institute of History of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Science, Novosibirsk, Russian Federation

**E-mail:** [svlubich@yandex.ru](mailto:svlubich@yandex.ru), <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8349-1359>

**Abstract.** The article is devoted to the study of the khan's rule in the 18th century and to the beginning of the transformation of the supreme power of the Steppe after the inclusion of the Younger Horde Kazakhs into the Russian Empire. During the reign of the Kazakh khans Abulkhair and Ablai, there were invasions of the Jungars into the territory of Kazakh Hordes, uprisings of the Bashkirs and their transition to the territory of Kazakhstan, as well as the strengthening of the imperial influence in the Steppe. The article analyzes the role and policy of the Kazakh Chinggisids in this historical period, the influence of political factors on ethnocultural ones, and examines the interpersonal relations of the rulers of the Steppe.

The article focuses on the role of Khan Ablai in protecting the honor of the family of Khan Abulkhair after his death, analyzes the strategy of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire to prevent Ablai from getting closer to the Jungars, and then to the Qing Empire, proposals by experts on the Kazakh Steppe P. Rychkov and A. Tevkelev to regulate relations with the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde, and pays attention to the relationship between Ablai and the Jungar ruler after returning from captivity.

**Key words:** «altyn urug», Abulkhair khan, Abylai khan, bashkirs revolt, Collegium of Foreign Affairs, Russian Empire, Jungarian khanate

### Introduction.

The institute of khan's power was inherited by the Kazakhs from the preceding institutions of power formed on the territory of Kazakhstan in the Middle Ages. Since the era of Genghis Khan, the right of 'altyn urug' (Chinggis Khan's clan, 'golden clan') to supreme power was established in the steppe. 'Chinggisism sanctified the right of Genghis Khan's clan to supreme power. This was expressed in the fact that the title 'khan' became exclusively the prerogative of the Chinggisids. The attempt to appropriate the title of khan by non-Chinggisid in the consciousness of the Turkic-Mongolian people and other nations was reflected as illegal and even immoral', - wrote V.P. Yudin [1, P.114].

The genealogical right of the Chinggisids to rule was enshrined by political tradition and was unconditionally valid throughout the territory conquered by the Mongols, where the principles of the official ideology of Mongolian statehood continued to live on. Even Timur (1335-1405), famous for his conquests, who created a huge empire on the territory of Central Asia and Persia, but who had no hereditary rights to supreme power, adopted the title of emir. As T.I. Sultanov writes: 'he enthroned false Chinggisid khans and called himself the representative of the "owner of the throne" (sahib at-takht)' [2, P. 60].

In the XV-XVIII centuries, due to the established worldview and ideology of Chinggisism, only Chinggisids were installed on the khan's throne in the states that were once part of the Mongol Empire. A striking example is the fact that Kazakh khans were invited to the throne in the states of Central Asia and the Volga region as the eldest of the 'altyn urug'. For example, during the Bashkir rebellion of 1735-1740, in 1737-1738 Abulkhair (khan of the Younger Horde) was the khan of Bashkiria, who was sent to suppress this rebellion [3, P.150-158].

The archives testify that Abulkhair Khan was not only 'the Khan of Karakalpak and Bashkir', he ruled for some time in the Khanate of Khiva, and then the Khiva throne was occupied by his son Nuraly, where 'the Kirghiz-Kaisaks were in danger and difficulty from the Zyungors and Persians'. Ablai was also Khan of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.

XVIII century in the history of Kazakhstan is an epoch of transformations, an epoch of large military companies against Jungars. The very epoch in this period brought to the historical arena two outstanding commanders, batyrs, the founder's descendants of the Kazakh khanate Zhanibek: Abulkhair and Abylai.

### **Material and research methodology.**

The source base of this research comprises documents identified by the authors in the holdings of major Russian archives, which contain materials pertaining to the history of modern Kazakhstan.

The study draws on sources from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI, Moscow). Specifically, the research utilizes documents from Fond 113, "Jungar Affairs," and No. 122, "Kyrgyz-Kaisak Affairs," which include materials on the interactions between the Kazakh elite and their neighboring entities: the Jungar Khanate and the Khiva Khanate. These collections encompass records related to the foreign policy of the Russian Empire, as well as materials on Russian-Kazakh, Russian-Khivan, and Kazakh-Jungar relations, alongside documentation on the activities of the Orenburg administration in the southeastern frontier regions, among other topics.

Based on their provenance, the documents employed in this study can be broadly categorized into two groups: administrative records and materials of personal origin. Administrative records, such as reports and memoranda prepared by regional officials, provide insights into the rationale and motivations underlying the policies of the Russian administration in the Steppe, as well as the personal viewpoints of individual actors on specific issues.

The methodological framework of this research is grounded in the historical-comparative and historical-descriptive approaches. The historical-comparative method facilitated the identification of both commonalities and distinctions in the Russian Empire's policies within its borderlands. The historical-descriptive method was employed to narrate events occurring both in the imperial periphery and in the capital. The reconstruction and description of historical phenomena characteristic of the studied era enable a systematic presentation of the events that unfolded during the period under investigation.

### **Results and discussion of it.**

The Kazakh khans were direct descendants of Chinggis Khan, tracing their lineage to his eldest son, Jochi. Abulkhair - Khan is the Younger Horde, descendant of Oseke Sultan, son of little-known Kazhai Sultan. Abylai is a descendant of Zhadik Sultan. His genealogical line can be built as follows: Zhanibek khan - Zhadik sultan - Shygai khan - Yesim khan - Zhangir khan - Vali sultan - Ablai sultan - Vali sultan - Ablai khan.

According to I.V. Erofeeva, in the spring of 1710 at the congress of national representatives of the Younger and Middle Hordes in the Karakums influential elders of Kazakh clans shekty, karakesek and other subdivisions of alshyns, many clans of generations baiuly and jetiru of the Younger Horde, as well as several families of naimans and kypchaks of the Middle Horde who present at this forum elected Abulkhair as their khan [4, P.104].

During the first Kazakh-Jungar war Abulkhair led the Kazakh militia. Under his leadership, the Kazakhs won the victory at the Bulanty River (1727) and in the battle of Anrakai.

In 1729, Abulkhair, the khan of the Younger Horde of the Kazakhs, sent an embassy led by Bekbulat to Tobolsk with the aim of regulating relations between the Kazakhs and their northern neighbors. In 1730, Khan Abulkhair, having decided to annex the Younger Horde to Russia, sent a letter to the Russian empress seeking her protection. Among the primary reasons for turning to Russia, he cited the complex relations with the Bashkirs. During this period, the Jungar aggression temporarily subsided, and clashes with the Volga Kalmyks also ceased for a time.

The pressing issue for the Kazakhs remained the search for a strong ally and protector in their struggle against the Jungar Khanate. Abulkhair aimed to reclaim the ancestral nomadic lands and the Syr Darya cities in the southeastern region that had been seized by the Jungars. These challenging

circumstances drove part of the Kazakh political elite to seek support from the Russian government.

Abulkhair hoped to gain the right to use the pastures between the Volga and Yaik rivers, expand trade with Russia, suppress his rivals, and consolidate his sole authority in the Kazakh Steppe. In turn, the government of the Russian Empire believed that the inclusion of the Kazakhs as subjects would open up opportunities to transform the territory of Kazakhstan into a strategic base for advancing its policies in the East. Specifically, the Russian authorities intended to use the Kazakh khans to suppress Bashkir uprisings.

However, the Russian government feared the possibility of future joint actions by the Kazakhs and Bashkirs against Russia. It was deemed expedient to take advantage of the new favorable opportunities to thoroughly study the Bashkir territories, which had long remained largely inaccessible to the Ufa authorities.

The embassy sent in 1730 by the khan of the Younger Horde, requesting Russian protection for the Kazakhs of the Junior Horde, was successfully received in St. Petersburg. On February 19, Empress Anna Ioannovna signed a decree accepting the new subjects.

Among the reasons for the Kazakhs' appeal to their northern neighbor were the intensification of Kazakh-Jungar relations, conflicts over pastures and water sources with the Bashkirs and Kalmyks, who were under imperial control.

By annexing the Younger Horde, the khan managed to halt the claims of the Bashkirs and Kalmyks. The era of Khan Abulkhair is characterized, on the one hand, by his efforts to strengthen his power with the help of the Russian Empire, and on the other hand, by his involvement in the intrigues of the Orenburg governor, I.I. Neplyuev.

Abulkhair's death in 1748 and his departure from the geopolitical arena of Eurasia influenced the further course and change of the political situation in the steppe. The Russian government had new opportunities of actually obedience of the Kazakh rulers to the Tsarist throne. Tsarism interfered not only in the process of election of Kazakh khans, but also continued to apply various methods of dividing, pitting peoples against each other, and creating its agents in all stratum of the population. This is confirmed in the attitude towards Abylai Khan (Khan of the Middle Horde 1771-1780).

In the late 18th century Abylai Khan managed to restore the unity of the Kazakh khanate. But despite the fact that he was recognised by the nation as the khan of the three Hordes, tsarism, for its part, recognised him as the khan of the Middle Horde only. Russian authorities sought to keep the khan in the sphere of their influence and, fearing the power of the khan, tried to create opposition to him. This is evident from the letters of the Orenburg governor I.A. Reinsdorp to the Tsar: '... in the constraint in nobility and in the reduction of his Ablai's strength by the resolution to prepare a rival for him from Kirghiz-Kaisak chiefs, although the national custom and systematic alliance of this Horde removes that hope and removes that such a person of sultans from Kirghiz-Kaisaks was found as a rival to Ablai, which is necessary for this so important matter, because almost in that Horde sultans are related to him by kinship and property, except Abulfeez sultan ... he has disagreement with Ablai on their particularistic affairs'. [5, p.69]. Candidates from biys and elders were also proposed, among which were Bekbulat and Kenzhebai biys, who roamed against the Semipalatinsk fortress. Their offence was that Abylai Khan had taken Astrakhan Turkmens from them, allegedly to return them, but did not do what he promised. The governor of Orenburg, noting that they still resented each other, suggested that 'taking advantage of this hatred of them, if it would not be possible to put them or others like them as rivals to Abylai Khan and in case of local need to prepare them' [5, p.69]. Further he proposes to find out the relations of Abulfeiz Sultan, Bekbulat and Kenzhebay bi with Abylai, if they are in hostile relations, then inviting them to himself or sending reliable people to ensure that they in the case of 'his Abylai's actions against the local side' to report, and to make 'the embarrassment of his present nobility, and if there is a need to use the local army against him' [5, p.70].

During the period of disagreement with the policy of tsarism Abylai Khan, according to archival

sources, in 1776 took the Bashkirs to himself, as sources say 'the Bashkirs surrendered to subjection' [5, p.80]. Tobolsk governor Chicherin reported to the Senate that, as he was informed by Bukharian Ashir Muhammed Zarypov, 10 Bashkir elders came to Abylai and asked the khan to accept them as subjects and give them land near the Turgai River for nomads. Abylai promised to gather a council in spring and if the sultans and elders agreed, he promised to send an ambassador to Bashkiria [5, p.81]. These data are confirmed by other sultans [5, p.81].

What was the relationship between Abulkhair Khan and Sultan Abylai? Abylai was on good terms with Abulkhair. He went to him to consult on the most important foreign policy issues and listened sensitively to his opinion on topical issues of the Kazakhs. In 1749, in a letter to Abulkhair's main ideological opponent and ill-wisher, the Orenburg governor I.I. Neplyuev, Abylai called his predecessor 'our people's happiness keeper and father of the Kazakhs'[6, P.124]. He condemned the murderer and offered the khan's family his personal assistance in the implementation of the plan of blood feud. More than once he protected Abulkhair's second son Yeraly from Barak and patronised the young chinggizid.

During the second Kazakh-Jungar war (1739-1742) Abylai shows his batyr qualities, he rises to the historical arena as a political figure. In 1741 he was captured by the Jungars. It was Abulkhair's assistance, his skilful arguments that prompted I.I. Neplyuev to send an embassy to Galdan Tseren (1727-1745). In the spring of 1743 Ablai was released as a result of an ultimatum of the Russian diplomatic mission headed by Major Karl Miller, sent from Orsk to Urga in the autumn of 1742.

While on his way to his nomads, Ablai sent men to Abulmambet with a notice of his release and asked him to convey to both the khan and others his displeasure that the Kazakhs had done nothing about it.

After his return from captivity, Galdan-Tseren and Ablai outwardly established friendly relations. Moreover, Ablai moved with his ulus to nomadic lands belonging to the Jungarian Khanate. Lieutenant F. Ablyazov, who travelled to Jungaria in early 1745, reported that Kazakhs roamed along the Tsar-Gurbanu river, which was the border of Jungarian possessions. These relations between Ablai and the Oirat court continued after the death of Galdan-Tseren until the early 50s, when fierce wars began in Jungaria and the Kazakhs became active participants in these events.

The sources also tell us about ethno-cultural contacts between the rulers of the steppe. Some representatives of the Kazakh upper class, in particular Ablai Khan and his contemporary, the Khan of the Elder Horde Zholbarys, knew Persian and Oirat languages. There is a known case when they had to 'interpret' to the Qing ambassadors, whose interpreter did not speak Kazakh well, 'in Kolmatsk and Persian conversation'. In 1759 the Qing authorities 'sent back to Ablai-sultan with letters in two languages - Kalmyk and Mungal' his ambassadors who had visited the court of the Qing emperor. In addition, Russian sources report that 'he himself Ablai can read and write Chinese and knows the conversation on purpose'.

Having recognised his allegiance to Russia in 1740 and swearing allegiance to Empress Anna Ioannovna, Ablai, as well as Khan Abulmambet, did not consider himself bound by any obligations towards Russia, except for guarantees of security of Siberian villages and trade caravans travelling from Central Asia to Russia and back. At the same time, seeking expansion of pasture territories, access to Siberian markets, cessation of attacks on Kazakh lands by Volga Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Siberian and Ovatsk Cossacks, as well as assistance in case of war with the Jungarian Khanate, Ablai maintained regular contacts with Siberian and Orenburg authorities, sent his representatives to St. Petersburg. Active military and diplomatic activities of the Russian government and the local Orenburg administration to prevent Oirat invasions into Kazakhstan and to assist in the release of Ablai from Jungar captivity led to further strengthening of these contacts, which became more friendly.

Remaining a virtually independent owner, Ablai informed the royal administration mainly only about his foreign policy moves, presenting events in a favourable light. If the requests and even demands of the royal authorities did not correspond to his goals, he, under various plausible pretexts, did not fulfil



them. Thus, he did not send Davatsi and Amursana to Orenburg, did nothing to capture Karasakala (the leader of the Bashkir rebellion of 1740, who escaped to the Kazakh steppe - G.I.).

Inter-feudal strife in Jungaria, the opportunity to put his protégé on the Oirat throne again made Ablai more cautious and even secretive in relations with royal officials.

The defeat of the Jungarian Khanate by the Qing Empire and the establishment of contacts between Ablai and the Manchurian government caused serious concern in Russian government circles, prompted St. Petersburg to intensify its policy in Kazakhstan. In the decree of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs of 6 May 1758, the Orenburg and Siberian administration explained the danger of contacts between Ablai and other Kazakh owners with the Qing. In the opinion of the Cabinet, it could lead to the rupture of relations of the Younger and Middle Hordes with Russia and their transfer to Manchurian subjection, which would deprive the Siberian borders of a protective barrier.

The local administration took a number of measures to suppress the attempts of the Manchurian court to strengthen its position in Kazakhstan. At the same time the tsarist authorities ordered to send an experienced man to Ablai's headquarters urgently with the task of persuading Amursana to come to Orenburg. However, Ablai kept Amursana virtually in custody and did not allow the Bashkir petty officer A. Kaskinov sent by I.I. Neplyuev even to meet with him. Kaskinov, sent by I.I. Neplyuev, even to meet the Jungarian prince.

The Orenburg administration made strenuous attempts to gather the owners of the Younger and Middle Hordes to Orenburg and explain them all the dangers of rapprochement with the Qing Empire. However, only the Khan of the Younger Hordes Nuraly and his sons accompanied by a group of elders came to Orenburg in September 1757 to meet the Orenburg governor I.I. Neplyuev.

On 3 December 1757, a letter from Ablai was delivered to Orenburg. In the letter he notified the tsarist authorities about the conclusion of a truce with the command of the Qing armies that had invaded the border Kazakh nomads.

Local authorities of Orenburg and Siberia constantly sent their representatives to the rates of Kazakh owners in order to clarify the situation in the Steppe. Tsarist authorities began to pay salaries to a number of large feudal lords and elders of the Younger and Middle Kazakh Hordes, allowed trade to Kazakhs in Yamyshev, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Omsk, Zverinogolovskaya, Zhelezhenskaya and Lebyazhya fortresses[7, p.113-113].

It should be said that the administration in the centre and locally somewhat exaggerated the degree of rapprochement between Ablai and the Qing court, partly it was under the influence of denunciations of Kazakh feudal lords unfriendly to the Sultan.

After the danger of attack of Qing troops on the border fortifications of Russia in Siberia had passed, the Senate on 27 August 1758 issued a decree obliging not to weaken efforts to prevent the rapprochement of Ablai and some other Kazakh owners with the Qing.

On 19 May 1758 A.I. Tevkelev and P.I. Rychkov submitted to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs a note on the state of affairs in Kazakh Steppe and their considerations regarding the strengthening of Russia's positions in the Middle and Younger Kazakh Hordes. For this purpose they proposed to make the Kazakh rulers Nuraly, Ablai to prevent Manchus from gaining a foothold in the former Jungar lands. This document substantiates the inexpediency of personally A.I. Tevkelev or P.I. Rychkov to go to the Kazakh nomads when receiving the news about the attack of the Qing troops on the Siberian fortresses. All this would lead to a significant loss of time. The authors suggested to invite the Kazakh owners in Orenburg and agree on everything in advance, and in case of danger to be limited to send officers with small teams to the Hordes [8, p.36-38].

On 31 July 1758 the Collegium of Foreign Affairs approved this and other proposals of A.I. Tevkelev and P.I. Rychkov, but recommended to be careful during the meeting with Ablai and at all costs to induce the owners of the Middle Horde to prevent the Qing from strengthening in Jungaria. If Ablai wouldn't come to Orenburg, A.I. Tevkelev had to go to the Troitsk fortress or to the Sultan's headquarters

and look for an opportunity to meet with them for negotiations.

In July 1758, Ablai informed A.I. Tevkelev about the return of his first embassy from Beijing. In the same message he asked the Orenburg administration to return his men kept in Russian fortresses and to give him horses stolen from Kazakh herds [9, p.99]. Soon Ablai made a new request - to allow his brother Yulbars to go to St. Petersburg to the Empress. This permission was granted and in the summer of 1758 Ablai's embassy left for the capital of the Russian Empire. In this way Ablai tried to dispel suspicion in the ruling circles of the empire and show that the establishment of ties with the Qing court did not affect his relations with Russia, he was and remains a subject of the Russian crown.

The reluctance of the administration to satisfy Ablai's requests to return horses stolen by Bashkirs or Russian Cossacks and peasants to the Kazakhs, as well as harassment in trade, aggravated the conflicts. In 1769 Ablai complained to K. Kazanbayev who came to him from the governor of Orenburg I. A. Reinsdorp about the commander of the Siberian lines, Major-General Devits, who did not take any measures on complaints of Kazakhs, about the arbitrariness of tsarist officials.

In 1779 the Orenburg governor-general I.A. Reinsdorp reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Abylai wanted "to establish his stay in Turkestan on account of the reprimand from him Captain Dudin, Trukhmens, and any rank of Russian people, which he did not want to give out" [5, p.66].

In the autumn of 1779, Ablai managed to subdue the Tianshan Kyrgyz, as well as to conquer a part of the prisyrdaya towns in the suburbs of Turkestan and Tashkent in a struggle with the rulers of Fergana.

A year later returning from Fergana, Ablai died near Tashkent and was buried in Turkestan in the mosque of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi.

**Conclusion.** The era of the two great khans, Abulkhair and Ablai, is marked, on the one hand, by their struggle against the Jungars, and on the other, by their participation in and reception of Bashkirs fleeing from the Volga region. While Abulkhair led the fight against the Jungars and defended the independence of Kazakh lands, Ablai, after being captured by the Jungar Khuntaiji, established friendly relations with him. It was during his reign that Soviet historians characterized his policy as "maneuvering between two states."

### References

1. Judin V.P. Ordy: Belaja, Sinjaja, Seraja, Zolotaja...// Kazahstan, Srednjaja i Central'naja Azija v XVI-XVIII vv. – Alma-Ata, 1983. – S.106-165.
2. Sultanov T.I. Podnjatye na beloј koshme. Potomki Chingiz hana. – Almaty, 2001. – 276 s.
3. Izbassarova G.B. XVIII gasyrdagy қазақ-bashkurt ара қатynastaryndagy saјasi zhane jetnikalyk urdister. – Aktobe, 2008. – 232 b.
4. Erofeeva I.V. Han Abulhair: polkovodec, pravitel', politik. – Almaty, 2007. – 484 s.
5. Arhiv vneshej politiki Rossijskoj imperii (AVPRI). F.122. O.122/3. D.1.
6. Erofeeva I.V. Simvoly kazahskoj gosudarstvennosti (pozdnee srednevekov'e i novoe vremja). – Almaty, 2001. – 152 s.
7. AVPRI. F. 113. Jungorskie dela. Op. 113/1. 1758. D. 4.
8. AVPRI. F.122. Kirgiz-kajsackie dela. Op.122/1. 1758. D.3.

### Список литературы

1. Юдин В.П. Орды: Белая, Синяя, Серая, Золотая...// Казахстан, Средняя и Центральная Азия в XVI-XVIII вв. – Алма-Ата, 1983. – С.106-165.
2. Султанов Т.И. Поднятые на белой кошме. Потомки Чингиз хана. – Алматы, 2001. – 276 с.
3. Избасарова Г.Б. XVIII ғасырдағы қазақ-башқұрт ара қатынастарындағы саяси және этникалық үрдістер. – Ақтөбе, 2008. – 232 б.
4. Ерофеева И.В. Хан Абулхайр: полководец, правитель, политик. – Алматы, 2007. – 484 с.

5. Архив внешней политики Российской империи (АВПРИ). Ф.122. О.122/3. Д.1.
6. Ерофеева И.В. Символы казахской государственности (позднее средневековье и новое время). – Алматы, 2001. – 152 с.
7. АВПРИ. Ф. 113. Зюнгорские дела. Оп. 113/1. 1758. Д. 4.
8. АВПРИ. Ф.122. Киргиз-кайсацкие дела. Оп.122/1. 1758. Д.3.

## ҰЛЫ ДАЛАНЫҢ ТАРИХИ ТҮЛҒАЛАРЫ: ӘБІЛҚАЙЫР ХАН МЕН АБЫЛАЙ СҰЛТАН

ЛЮБИЧАНКОВСКИЙ С.В.<sup>1</sup> 

**Любичанковский Сергей Валентинович<sup>1</sup>** – тарих ғылымдарының докторы, профессор, жетекші ғылыми қызметкер, Ресей Ғылым Академиясының Сібір бөлімінің тарих институты, Новосибирск, Ресей Федерациясы  
**E-mail:** [svlubich@yandex.ru](mailto:svlubich@yandex.ru), <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8349-1359>

**Андатпа.** Мақала XVIII ғасырдағы хан билігі институтын, Кіші жүз қазақтарының Ресей империясының құрамына кіргеннен кейінгі Даладағы жоғарғы биліктің қайта құрылу үдерісінің басталуын зерттеуге арналған. Қазақ хандары Әбілқайыр мен Абылай тұсында жоңғарлардың қазақ жүздерінің жеріне басып кіруі, башқұрттардың көтерілісі және олардың Қазақстан жеріне өтуі, Даладағы империялық билік ықпалының күшеюі мәселелері қарастырылады.

Мақалада қазақ Шыңғыс хан ұрпақтарының осы тарихи кезеңдегі рөлі мен саясаты, саяси факторлардың этномәдени факторларға әсері талданып, Дала билеушілерінің тұлғааралық қарым-қатынастары зерттеледі.

Мақалада Әбілқайыр хан қайтыс болғаннан кейін оның әулетінің намысын қорғаудағы Абылай ханның рөліне назар аударылып, Ресей империясы Сыртқы істер алқасының Абылайдың жоңғарлар мен одан әрі Цин империясымен жақындасуына жол бермеу стратегиясына талдау жасалды. Еңбекте Қазақ даласын өте жетік білген П.Рычков пен А.Тевкелевтің Орта жүз қазақтарымен қарым-қатынасты реттеу туралы ұсыныстары, Абылайдың тұтқыннан оралғаннан кейін жоңғар билеушісімен қарым-қатынасы зерттелген.

**Түйін сөздер:** «алтын ұрық», Әбілқайыр хан, Абылай хан, башқұрт көтерілістері, Сыртқы Істер коллегиясы, Ресей империясы, Жоңғар хандығы

## ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ ЛИЧНОСТИ ВЕЛИКОЙ СТЕПИ: ХАН АБУЛХАИР И СУЛТАН АБЛАЙ

ЛЮБИЧАНКОВСКИЙ С.В.<sup>1</sup> 

**Любичанковский Сергей Валентинович<sup>1</sup>** – доктор исторических наук, профессор, ведущий научный сотрудник, Институт истории Сибирского отделения РАН, Новосибирск, Российская Федерация  
**E-mail:** [svlubich@yandex.ru](mailto:svlubich@yandex.ru), <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8349-1359>

**Аннотация.** Статья посвящена изучению института ханской власти в XVIII в., начала процесса трансформации высшей власти Степи после включения Младшего жуза казахов в состав Российской империи. В период правления казахских ханов Абулхаира и Аблая происходят вторжения джунгар на территорию казахских жузов, восстания башкир и их переход на территорию Казахстана, усиление влияния имперской власти в Степи. В статье анализируется роль и политика казахских чингизидов в этот исторический период, влияние политических факторов на этнокультурные факторы, исследуются межличностные отношения правителей Степи.

В статье уделяется внимание на роль хана Аблая по защите чести семьи хана Абулхаира после его смерти, анализируется стратегия Коллегии иностранных дел Российской империи по не допущению сближения Аблая с джунгарами, а затем с Цинской империей, предложения знатоков казахской Степи П. Рычкова и А. Тевкелева по регулированию отношений с казаками Среднего жуза, уделяется внимание взаимоотношениям Аблая с джунгарским правителем после возвращения из плена.

**Ключевые слова:** «алтын уруғ», Абулхаир хан, Абылай хан, башкирские восстания, коллегия иностранных дел, Российская империя, Джунгарское ханство